From 1d920c284bf899a52ab458d40295e28f16a2b202 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Olaf Hering Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2011 20:07:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] fix Xen detection for xenfs in pv_ops kernel The pv_ops kernel in mainline Linux provides xenfs which has to be mounted at /proc/xen. It creates /proc/xen/capabilities unconditionally which makes it impossible to distinguish PVonHVM guests from PV guests. Use code from xen-detect.c to check wether kexec runs on a PV guest. Without this change PVonHVM guests will be detected incorrectly as plain PV guests. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering Signed-off-by: Simon Horman --- kexec/crashdump-xen.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kexec/crashdump-xen.c b/kexec/crashdump-xen.c index 44e5dfc..b347764 100644 --- a/kexec/crashdump-xen.c +++ b/kexec/crashdump-xen.c @@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include "kexec.h" #include "crashdump.h" #include "kexec-syscall.h" @@ -27,13 +29,93 @@ struct crash_note_info { static int xen_phys_cpus; static struct crash_note_info *xen_phys_notes; + +/* based on code from xen-detect.c */ static int is_dom0; +#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) +static jmp_buf xen_sigill_jmp; +void xen_sigill_handler(int sig) +{ + longjmp(xen_sigill_jmp, 1); +} + +static void xen_cpuid(uint32_t idx, uint32_t *regs, int pv_context) +{ + asm volatile ( +#ifdef __i386__ +#define R(x) "%%e"#x"x" +#else +#define R(x) "%%r"#x"x" +#endif + "push "R(a)"; push "R(b)"; push "R(c)"; push "R(d)"\n\t" + "test %1,%1 ; jz 1f ; ud2a ; .ascii \"xen\" ; 1: cpuid\n\t" + "mov %%eax,(%2); mov %%ebx,4(%2)\n\t" + "mov %%ecx,8(%2); mov %%edx,12(%2)\n\t" + "pop "R(d)"; pop "R(c)"; pop "R(b)"; pop "R(a)"\n\t" + : : "a" (idx), "c" (pv_context), "S" (regs) : "memory" ); +} + +static int check_for_xen(int pv_context) +{ + uint32_t regs[4]; + char signature[13]; + uint32_t base; + + for (base = 0x40000000; base < 0x40010000; base += 0x100) + { + xen_cpuid(base, regs, pv_context); + + *(uint32_t *)(signature + 0) = regs[1]; + *(uint32_t *)(signature + 4) = regs[2]; + *(uint32_t *)(signature + 8) = regs[3]; + signature[12] = '\0'; + + if (strcmp("XenVMMXenVMM", signature) == 0 && regs[0] >= (base + 2)) + goto found; + } + + return 0; + +found: + xen_cpuid(base + 1, regs, pv_context); + return regs[0]; +} + +static int xen_detect_pv_guest(void) +{ + struct sigaction act, oldact; + int is_pv = -1; + + if (setjmp(xen_sigill_jmp)) + return is_pv; + + memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act)); + act.sa_handler = xen_sigill_handler; + sigemptyset (&act.sa_mask); + if (sigaction(SIGILL, &act, &oldact)) + return is_pv; + if (check_for_xen(1)) + is_pv = 1; + sigaction(SIGILL, &oldact, NULL); + return is_pv; +} +#else +static int xen_detect_pv_guest(void) +{ + return 1; +} +#endif +/* + * Return 1 if its a PV guest. + * This includes dom0, which is the only PV guest where kexec/kdump works. + * HVM guests have to be handled as native hardware. + */ int xen_present(void) { if (!is_dom0) { - if (access("/proc/xen/capabilities", F_OK) == 0) - is_dom0 = 1; + if (access("/proc/xen", F_OK) == 0) + is_dom0 = xen_detect_pv_guest(); else is_dom0 = -1; } -- 1.7.1